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DISTANCES BETWEEN FORMAL THEORIES
MICHE`LE FRIEND, MOHAMED KHALED, KOEN LEFEVER AND GERGELY SZE´KELY
Abstract. In the literature, there have been several methods and definitions for working out if
two theories are “equivalent” (essentially the same) or not. In this article, we do something subtler.
We provide means to measure distances (and explore connections) between formal theories. We
introduce two main notions for such distances. The first one is that of axiomatic distance, but
we argue that it might be of limited interest. The more interesting and widely applicable notion
is that of conceptual distance which measures the minimum number of concepts that distinguish
two theories. For instance, we use conceptual distance to show that relativistic and classical
kinematics are distinguished by one concept only. We also develop further notions of distance,
and we include a number of suggestions for applying and extending our project.
1. Introduction
It is well known that the theory of strict partial orders and the theory of partial orders are “equiv-
alent”, i.e., they have the same essential content. To capture this vague idea, defining a precise
equivalence between theories, several formal definitions have been made, e.g., logical equivalence,
definitional equivalence, categorical equivalence, etc. Which theory is equivalent to which other
theory depends on the point of view from which one decides to explore the equivalence between the
theories in question.
In the last few decades, the concept of equivalence between theories (henceforth: “theory-equivalence”)
has become important for studying the connections between formal theories. Many interest-
ing results have been derived from investigating such equivalence, e.g., [Andre´ka et al., 2005],
[Barrett and Halvorson, 2016], [Japaridze and Jongh, 1998], [Pinter, 1978] and [Visser, 2006]. We
can also look at the question starting from non-equivalence. Given two non-equivalent theories
(according to any chosen definition of theory-equivalence), some natural questions arise: (1) Can
these theories be modified into equivalent theories (in a non-trivial way)? (2) If this can be done,
can we do it in finitely many steps? In other words, what is the degree of their non-equivalence?
In this article, we lay down the first steps of a research programme to answer these questions. In
order to investigate some ways to measure how far two theories are from each other; we introduce a
framework that can give a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the connections between formal
theories. We focus on formal theories that are formulated in any of the following logical systems:
sentential logic, ordinary first order logic (FOL), finite variables fragments of FOL and/or infinitary
versions of FOL. We develop several notions for distances between theories, we discuss these notions
and we make comparisons between them.
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The idea is very simple: based on a symmetric relation capturing a notion of minimal change, we
introduce a general way to define a distance on any class of objects (not just theories) equipped
with an equivalence relation. The idea is a generalization of the distance between any two nodes in
the same graph, in graph theory. After, we give particular examples when the given class is a class
of theories and the equivalence relation is a fixed notion of theory-equivalence.
The first particular example, is that of logical equivalence. As a measure for the degree of logical
non-equivalence, we introduce the concept of axiomatic distance. The idea is to count the minimum
number of axioms that are needed to be added or “removed” to get from one theory to the other.1
Since any finite number of axioms can be concatenated by conjunction resulting in only one axiom,
one may think that the axiomatic distance, if it is finite, between two given theories T and T ′ must
be ≤ 2, i.e., we need at most two steps to get T from T ′: one step for axiom addition and another
one for axiom removal. This is why we have the intuition that axiomatic distance may not be very
interesting, cf., Problem 1 and Theorem 3.11.
Then we turn to definitional equivalence. Two theories are definitionally equivalent if they cannot
be distinguished by a concept (a formula defining some notion). As a measure for the degree
of definitional non-equivalence, we define conceptual distance. This distance counts the minimum
number of concepts that separate two theories. We find that this distance is of special interest in the
study of logic. We give examples and we count conceptual distance between some specific theories,
see, e.g., Theorem 4.7 and Theorem 4.10. We also explore a connection between conceptual distance
and spectrum of theories which is a central topic in model theory, cf., Theorem 4.11.
In algebraic logic, Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of logical theories (sometimes these are called con-
cept algebras) are often introduced as the algebras of different concepts of the corresponding the-
ories. Thus, counting concepts amounts to counting elements of Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras. In
fact, our definition of conceptual distance herein is a careful translation of an algebraic distance
between Lindenbuam-Tarski algebras. Such an algebraic distance allows us to define conceptual
distance between theories in any algebraizable logic, e.g., modal logic and intuitionistic logic. This
general algebraic distance (and its application on concept algebras) is planned to be investigated
in details in a forthcoming algebra oriented paper.
Furthermore, we investigate the possible application of conceptual distance in the logical foundation
of physical theories in ordinary first order logic. We prove that conceptual distance between classical
and relativistic kinematics is one. In other words, only one concept distinguishes classical and
relativistic kinematics: the existence of a class of observers who are at absolute rest. This is indeed
an interesting result in its own right, not only for logicians but also for physicists. Such a result
opens several similar questions about how many concepts (and what are they) differentiate two
physical theories when their phenomena can be described in FOL.
In philosophy of physics, this might be important because, on the one hand it is clear that we are
not presently converging towards one unified theory of physics in the sense of converging to one
set of laws from which all the phenomena of physics can be derived. On the other hand, we can
give logical foundation to several physical theories: Newtonian mechanics, relativity theories and
some parts of quantum theory. Given these logical representations, we would like to know the exact
relationship between physical theories. If we know this, then we can form an impression of how
far we are from such a philosophical dream – the dream of the unity of physics. Or, we can adjust
1By “removing an axiom” here we only mean the trivial converse of adding an axiom in the following sense: T is
a theory resulting from “removing” one axiom from T ′ if T ′ can be reached from T by adding one axiom.
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our hopes and expectations, and rest content with a unity of science at a more general level: as a
network of logical theories with precise relations between them.
With definitions and metrics on distance developed here, we have maps of the network of logical
theories. When we draw such maps of networks, the topology may suggest very interesting and
fruitful questions. For instance: if there is a distance other than zero or one, then is there already
a known theory in between? or if not, we can ask what are the limitative properties of that theory
and what is its philosophical significance? By engaging in such studies, we see the “edge” of the
limitative results, and by examining this edge we more precisely understand the rapport between
meta-logical limitative results and physical phenomena.
In the present paper, we assume familiarity with the basic notions of set theory. For instance, what
is a set, a class, a relation, etc. The only difference is that in several occurrences in this paper, we
decided not to distinguish different kinds of infinities. Therefore, together with the standard notion
of cardinality, we are going to speak about the size of set X , defined as follows:
||X ||
def
=
{
k X is finite and has exactly k-many elements,
∞ if X is an infinite set.
We also make use of von Neumann ordinals. For example, ω is the smallest infinite ordinal, some-
times we denote ω by N to indicate that it is the set of natural numbers (non-negative integers).
2. Notions of logic
In the course of this paper, let α and β ≤ α + 1 be two fixed ordinals. We consider a natural
generalisation of ordinary first order logic, we denote it by Lβα, which is inspired from the definitions
and the discussions in [Henkin et al., 1985, section 4.3]. Roughly, the formulas of Lβα uses a fixed set
of individual variables {vi : i ∈ α} and relation symbols of rank strictly less than β. For simplicity,
we assume that our languages do not contain any function symbols and/or constant symbols.
In particular, L10 is sentential (propositional) logic, while L
ω
ω is ordinary first order logic. The so-
called finite variables fragments of first order logic are the logics Ln+1n , for finite ordinals n’s. When
α and β are infinite, Lβα is called infinitary logic. Throughout, since α and β are fixed, languages,
theories, etc., are understood to be languages for Lβα, theories in L
β
α, etc.
2.1. The syntax of Lβα. More precisely, A language L for L
β
α is a set of relation symbols such
that each relation symbol R ∈ L is assigned a rank rank(R) < β. Relation symbols of rank 0
are called sentential constants. To construct the formulas of language L, we also need some
other symbols: equality “=” (we deal with quantifier logics with identity), brackets “(” and “)”,
conjunction “∧”, negation “¬” and the existential quantifier “∃”. We also use the necessary symbols
to write sequences of variables (vim : m ∈ I), for any indexing set I ⊆ α. The set of formulas Fm
of L is the smallest set that satisfies:
(a) Fm contains each basic formula of L, where the basic formulas are the following two types
of formulas:
(i) The equalities vi = vj , for any i, j ∈ α.
(ii) R(vim : m < rank(R)), for any relation symbol R.
(b) Fm contains ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ and ∃vi ϕ, for each ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm.
As usual, we use the following abbreviations.
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• If P is a sentential constant, then we just write P instead of P ().
• If R is a relation symbol of finite positive rank, say k, then we write R(vi0 , . . . , vik−1) instead
of R(vim : m < k).
• We us disjunction, implication, equivalence and universal quantifier:
ϕ ∨ ψ
def
= ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ϕ→ ψ
def
= ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
ϕ↔ ψ
def
= (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ) ∀vi ϕ
def
= ¬(∃vi ¬ϕ)
• We also use grouped conjunction and disjunction: Empty disjunction is defined to be ϕ∧¬ϕ
and empty conjunction is defined to be ϕ∨¬ϕ (for any arbitrary but fixed formula ϕ ∈ Fm).
Let ϕ0, . . . , ϕm ∈ Fm, then∨
0≤i≤m
ϕi
def
= ϕ0 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕm and
∧
0≤i≤m
ϕi
def
= ϕ0 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕm.
2.2. The semantics of Lβα. A model M for language L is a non-empty set M enriched with
operations RM ⊆ M rank(R), for each R ∈ L (for a sentential constant P , PM ⊆ M0 = {∅}).2 An
assignment in M is a function τ that assigns for each variable an element of the set M . Let
ϕ ∈ Fm be any formula. The satisfiability relation M, τ |= ϕ is defined recursively as follows:
M, τ |= R(vim : m < rank(R)) iff (τ(vim ) : m < rank(R)) ∈ R
M, 3
M, τ |= vi = vj iff τ(vi) = τ(vj),
M, τ |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, τ |= ϕ and M, τ |= ψ,
M, τ |= ¬ϕ iff M, τ 6|= ϕ,
M, τ |= ∃vi ϕ iff there is a ∈M such that M, τ [vi 7→ a] |= ϕ,
where τ [vi 7→ a] is the assignment which agrees with τ on every variable except τ [vi 7→ a](vi) = a.
The cardinality of M is defined to be the cardinality of M . A formula ϕ is said to be true in M, in
symbols M |= ϕ, iff M, τ |= ϕ, for every assignment τ in M. A formula ϕ is said to be a tautology
iff it is true in every model for L. The theory of M is defined as:
Th(M)
def
= {ϕ ∈ Fm : M |= ϕ}.
We say that two models M and N for language L are isomorphic iff there is a bijection f :M → N
between their underlying sets that respects the meaning of the relation symbols, i.e., for each R ∈ L,
(ai : i < rank(R)) ∈ R
M ⇐⇒ (f(ai) : i < rank(R)) ∈ R
N.
2.3. Theories in the logic Lβα.
Definition 2.1. Suppose that L is a language and let Fm be its set of formulas. A theory T of L
is a set of formulas (subset of Fm).
We use the same superscripts and subscripts for theories and their corresponding languages and
formulas. For example, if we write T ′ is a theory, then we understand that T ′ is a theory of language
L′ whose set of formulas is Fm′. A model for theory T is a model for L in which every ψ ∈ T is
true. We say that theory T is consistent iff there is at least one model for T .
2So the meaning PM of a sentential constant P can be either true (T = {∅}) or false (F = ∅).
3If rank(P ) is 0, then (τ(vim ) : m < rank(P )) is the empty sequence ∅. Hence M, τ |= P iff P
M is true.
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Definition 2.2. Let T be a theory and let κ be any cardinal. The spectrum of T , in symbols
I(T, κ), is the number of its different models (up to isomorphism) of cardinality κ. This number is
defined to be ∞ if T has infinitely many non-isomorphic models of cardinality κ.
We say that a fomrula ϕ is a theorem of theory T , in symbols T |= ϕ, iff ϕ is true in every model
for T . The set of consequences of theory T is defined as follows:
Cn(T )
def
= {ϕ ∈ Fm : T |= ϕ}.
Definition 2.3. Two theories T1 and T2 are called logically equivalent, in symbols T1 ≡ T2, iff
they have the same consequences, i.e., Cn(T1) = Cn(T2).
2.4. More notions for theory-equivalence. A translation of language L1 into language L2 is
a map tr : Fm1 → Fm2 such that the following are true for every ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm and every vi, vj .
• tr(vi = vj) is vi = vj .
• tr commutes with the Boolean connectives:
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ) and tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ).
• Finally, tr(∃vi ϕ) = ∃vi tr(ϕ).
4
Definition 2.4. Suppose that T1 and T2 are theories in languages L1 and L2, respectively, and tr
is a translation of L1 into L2. The translation tr is said to be an interpretation of T1 into T2 iff
it maps theorems of T1 into theorems of T2, i.e., for each formula ϕ ∈ Fm1,
T1 |= ϕ =⇒ T2 |= tr(ϕ).
(a) An interpretation tr of T1 into T2 is called a faithful interpretation of T1 into T2 iff for each
formula ϕ ∈ Fm1,
T1 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T2 |= tr(ϕ).
(b) An interpretation tr12 of T1 into T2 is called a definitional equivalence between T1 and T2
iff there is an interpretation tr21 of T2 into T1 such that
• T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)
↔ ϕ,
• T2 |= tr12
(
tr21(ψ)
)
↔ ψ.
for every ϕ ∈ Fm1 and ψ ∈ Fm2. In this case, tr21 is also a definitional equivalence.
Definition 2.5. Two theories T1 and T2 are said to be definitionally equivalent, in symbols
T1 ⇄ T2, iff there is a definitional equivalence between them.
In the literature, there are several ways to define definitional equivalence. Here, we use a variant
of the definition in [Henkin et al., 1985, Definition 4.3.42 and Theorem 4.3.43]. For a discussion on
the different definitions of definitional equivalence, see [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018b], and we refer
to [Visser, 2006] for a category theory based discussion.
4 In the case of ordinary first order logic (when α = β = ω), to define a translation tr : Fm1 → Fm2, it suffices to
define tr on the basic formulas in Fm1 of the form vi = vj and R(v0, . . . , vm−1). Then, using Tarski’s substitution
observation, we can define
tr(R(vi1 , . . . , vim )) = ∃v0(v0 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∃vm−1(vm−1 = ym∧
∃y1(y1 = vi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∃ym(ym = vim ∧ tr(R(v0, . . . , vm−1)))))),
where yi = vl+i and l is the maximum of 0, . . . ,m − 1, i1, . . . , im. This can be extended in a unique way to a
translation that covers the whole Fm1.
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Proposition 2.6. Let T1 and T2 be two theories and suppose that tr12 : Fm1 → Fm2 is a definitional
equivalence between T1 and T2, then tr12 is also a faithful interpretation.
Proof. Let T1 and T2 be two theories, and let tr12 : Fm1 → Fm2 be a definitional equivalence between
them. Let ϕ ∈ Fm1, we should show that T1 |= ϕ iff T2 |= tr12(ϕ). Since tr12 is an interpretation,
we have that T1 |= ϕ implies T2 |= tr12(ϕ). To show the converse, let us assume that T2 |= tr12(ϕ).
By Definition 2.4, there is an interpretation tr21 of T2 into T1 such that T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)
↔ ϕ.
Since tr21 is an interpretation and T2 |= tr12(ϕ), we have T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)
. Consequently, T1 |= ϕ
since T1 |= tr21
(
tr12(ϕ)
)
↔ ϕ; and this is what we need to show. 
Definition 2.7. Let T1 and T2 be two theories. We say that T2 is a conservative extension of
T1, in symbols T1 ⊑ T2, iff Fm1 ⊆ Fm2 and, for all ϕ ∈ Fm1, T2 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T1 |= ϕ.
We note that T1 ⊑ T2 iff the identity translation id : Fm1 → Fm2 is a faithful interpretation. It is
also worth mentioning that T1 ⊑ T2 ⇐⇒ T1 ≡ Cn(T2) ∩ Fm1.
3. Cluster networks & Step distance
Now, we introduce a general way of defining a distance on any given class X. We note that our
target is to define distances on the class of all theories, thus we need to work with classes which are
not necessarily sets.
Definition 3.1. By a cluster (X,E) we mean a class X equipped with an equivalence relation E.5
We are interested in distances according to which some different objects are indistinguishable.
Indeed, it is natural to treat equivalent theories as if they were of distance 0 from each other. As
we mentioned in the introduction, there are several notions of equivalence between theories. Such
equivalence thus can be represented in the cluster of theoreis by the relation E.
Definition 3.2. A cluster network is a triple (X,E, S), where (X,E) is a cluster and S is a
symmetric relation on X.6
Given a cluster network (X,E, S). A path leading from T ∈ X to T ′ ∈ X in (X,E, S) is a finite
sequence b1, . . . , bm of 0’s and 1’s such that there is a sequence T0, . . . , Tm of members of X with
T0 = T , Tm = T
′ and, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
bi = 0 ⇐⇒ Ti−1 ETi and bi = 1 ⇐⇒ Ti−1 STi.
The length of this path is defined to be
∑m
i=1 bi. Two objects T, T
′ ∈ X are connected in (X,E, S)
iff there is a path leading from one of them to the other in (X,E, S).
Definition 3.3. Let X = (X,E, S) be a cluster network. The step distance on X is the function
dX : X×X→ N ∪ {∞} defined as follows. For each T, T ′ ∈ X:
• If T and T ′ are not connected in (X,E, S), then dX (T, T ′)
def
=∞.
5All definitions in this section can be formulated within von Neumann–Bernays–Go¨del set theory (NBG). Of
course, ordered pairs of proper classes cannot be formulated even in NBG, but we do not really need ordered pairs
here. Our definitions can be understood as follows: “for all classes X, E, etc., having certain properties there are
classes d, etc., such that...”. We use the notations (−,−) only to make our statements easier to be read and our
proofs easier to be followed.
6See footnote 5 above.
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• If T and T ′ are connected in (X,E, S), then
dX (T, T
′)
def
= min{k ∈ N : ∃ a path leading from T to T ′ whose length is k}.
The equivalence relation E represents pairs that cannot be distinguished by the step distance, while
the symmetric relation S represents the pairs of objects that are (at most) one step away from
each other. The step distance then counts the minimum number of steps needed to reach an object
starting from another one. We may need to say that infinitely many steps are needed, so we allow
∞ in the range of the step distance.
Example 3.4. Let X be any class, let E be the identity relation and let S = X × X. Then,
X = (X,E, S) is a cluster network and its step distance is the following discrete distance:
dX (T, T
′) =
{
0 if T = T ′,
1 if T 6= T ′.
Theorem 3.5. Let X = (X,E, S) be a cluster network and let dX : X×X→ N ∪ {∞} be the step
distance on X . The following are true for each T1, T2, T3 ∈ X:
(a) dX (T1, T2) ≥ 0, and dX (T1, T2) = 0 ⇐⇒ T1ET2.
(b) dX (T1, T2) = dX (T2, T1).
(c) dX (T1, T2) ≤ dX (T1, T3) + dX (T3, T2).
Proof. Let X = (X,E, S) and dX be as required. Let T1, T2, T3 ∈ X.
(a) Clearly, dX (T1, T2) ≥ 0 for any two T1, T2 ∈ X, and dX (T1, T2) = 0 if T1ET1 because then
0 is a path from T1 to T2 in X . If dX (T1, T2) = 0, then there is a path 0, . . . , 0 from T1 to
T2 in X . So there is a sequence T ′0, . . . , T
′
m ∈ X such that T1 = T
′
0, T2 = T
′
m and T
′
i−1 ET
′
i
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence, T1ET2 since E is transitive.
(b) The symmetry is satisfied because E and S are symmetric relations. Hence, if b1, . . . , bm is
a path leading from T1 to T2 in X , then bm, . . . , b1 is a path leading from T2 to T1 in X .
(c) The triangle inequality dX (T1, T2) ≤ dX (T1, T3) + dX (T3, T2) follows from the definition
because, if b1, . . . , bm is a path leading from T1 to T3 in X and c1, . . . , ck is a path leading
from T3 to T2 in X , then b1, . . . , bm, c1, . . . , ck is a path leading from T1 to T2 in X . 
Remark 3.6. Let X = (X,E, S) and X ′ = (X′,E′, S′) be cluster networks such that X ⊆ X′,
E ⊆ E′ ∩ (X×X), and S ⊆ S′ ∩ (X×X). Since every path in X is contained in X ′, it is easy to see
that dX (T1, T2) ≥ dX ′(T1, T2) for each T1, T2 ∈ X.
Now, we use the above general settings to define distances between theories. Before we start, we
need the following convention: Suppose that we are given two theories T and T ′. We write T ← T ′
iff there is ϕ ∈ Fm such that T ∪ {ϕ} ≡ T ′. We also write T − T ′ iff either T ← T ′ or T ′ ← T .
Conventionally, we call the relation ← axiom adding, while the converse relation → is called
axiom removal. It is easy to see that the following are true for any theories T1, T2 and T3.
T1 ← T2 & T2 ← T3 =⇒ T1 ← T3,(1)
T1 ≡ T2 & T2 ← T3 =⇒ T1 ← T3,(2)
T1 ← T2 & T2 ≡ T3 =⇒ T1 ← T3.(3)
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Definition 3.7. Let X be a class of some theories (in the logic Lβα) and consider the cluster network
(X,≡,−). We call the step distance on this cluster network axiomatic distance on X. This step
distance will be denoted by AdX.
Let X be a class of theories. We note the following. If there is a path between T, T ′ ∈ X in the
cluster network (X,≡,−), then both T and T ′ must be formulated in the same language. In other
words, if T, T ′ are formulated on different languages, then AdX(T, T
′) = ∞. This is because two
theories can be logically equivalent only if they are formulated on the same language.
Example 3.8. Suppose that α ≥ 1 or β ≥ 1. Let X be a class of theories. Let T, T⊥ ∈ X be two
theories formulated in the same language. Suppose that T is consistent while T⊥ is inconsistent.
Then, adding a contradiction to T ensures that AdX(T, T⊥) = 1.
Example 3.9. Let X be a class of theories. Let T, ∅ ∈ X be two theories formulated in the same
language such that ∅ is an empty theory (i.e., empty set of formulas). Suppose that T is finitely
axiomatizable, then we have either
AdX(T, ∅) = 1 or T ≡ ∅.
Thus, in the class of all theories, the axiomatic distance between any two finitely axiomatizable
theories is ≤ 2.
Example 3.10. Suppose that α ≥ 3 and β ≥ 3. Let X be the set of all consistent theories of
binary relations, let TP be the theory of partial orders, and let TE be the theory of equivalence
relations. Then AdX(TP , TE) = 2. Clearly, AdX(TP , TE) ≥ 2 because none of Tp or TE implies the
other, and, by Example 3.9 and Theorem 3.5 (c), AdX(TP , TE) ≤ AdX(TP , ∅) + AdX(∅, TE) = 2.
This gives us the intuition that, in most of the cases, the axiomatic distance is either 0, 1, 2 or ∞.
For example, in any class X containing only complete and consistent theories, AdX is either 0 or
∞ because adding an axiom to a complete theory is either results in an equivalent theory or in an
inconsistent one. In the remaining of this section, we assume that α ≥ 1 or β ≥ 1.
Problem 1. Let X be the class of all consistent theories in Lβα. Is it true that, if the axiomatic
distance between T, T ′ ∈ X is finite, then it must be ≤ 2?
Now, let us try to answer the above problem. We define the properties illustrated in Figure 1. Let X
be a class of theories. We say that X has the theory amalgamation property iff for each T ∈ X,
if there are T1, T2 ∈ X such that T1 → T ← T2, then there is T ′ ∈ X such that T1 ← T ′ → T2.
Analogously, we say that X has the theory co-amalgamation property iff for each T ∈ X, if
there are T1, T2 ∈ X such that T1 ← T → T2, then there is T ′ ∈ X such that T1 → T ′ ← T2.
Theorem 3.11. Let X be a class of theories having the theory amalgamation property or the
theory co-amalgamation property. Then for all T, T ′ ∈ X, we have the following
(4) AdX(T, T
′) =


0 if T ≡ T ′,
1 if T ′ or T is finitely axiomatizable over the other,
∞ if T and T ′ are not connected in (X,≡,−),
2 otherwise.
Proof. Let us first assume that X has the theory amalgamation property. Suppose that T, T ′ ∈ X
are connected via a path of length 3 in the cluster network (X,≡,−). By (2) and (3), we can find
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T
T2T1
∃T ′
X
(a) amalgamation property
∃T ′
T2T1
T
X
(b) co-amalgamation property
Figure 1. Theory amalgamation properties
T1, T2 ∈ X such that T−T1−T2−T ′. Note that T, T1, T2, T ′ have the same language L and the same
set of formulas Fm. We first show that T and T ′ are connected by a path of length 2. If at least
two consecutive − in the path T −T1−T2−T ′ are in the same direction, e.g., T ← T1 → T2 → T ′,
then we are done by (1). So, we may assume that we have one of the cases illustrated in Figure 2:
T
T1
T2
T ′
T3
(a) Case 1
T
T1
T3
T ′
T2
(b) Case 2
Figure 2. 3-paths can be replaced by 2-paths
(a) Suppose that we are in the first case T ← T1 → T2 ← T ′. Then, by the theory amalgamation
property, there is T3 ∈ X such that T1 ← T3 → T
′. Hence, by (1), we have T ← T3 → T
′
which means T and T ′ are connected by a path of length 2.
(b) Suppose that we are in the second case T → T1 ← T2 → T ′. Then, by the theory amal-
gamation property, there is T3 ∈ X such that T ← T3 → T2. Hence, by (1), we have
T ← T3 → T ′ which means T and T ′ are connected by a path of length 2.
Therefore, any path of length 3 can be replaced by a path of length 2. Now, we can prove the
theorem. The first three cases of (4) are obvious, we need to show that otherwise the axiomatic
distance is 2. For this, it is enough to show that every path can be replaced by a path of length 2.
We use induction on the length of a path. If the path is of length l = 3, then we are done by the
above discussion. Suppose that we have already proven that every path not longer than l ≥ 3 can
be replaced by a path of length 2. Let path T − T1 − · · · − Tl − T ′ be a path of length l + 1. By
induction hypothesis, path T − T1 − · · · − Tl can be replaced by a path of length 2. Hence, path
T − T1 − · · · − Tl − T ′ can be replaced by a path of length 3, which can be replaced by a path of
length 2 by the induction hypothesis.
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1 1
T T ′
Figure 3. Shortening paths using the theory amalgamation property.
The above argument is illustrated in Figure 3. The proof of the case when X has the theory
co-amalgamation property is completely analogous, but going downwards instead of upwards. 
Even though Theorem 3.11 shows the simplicity of axiomatic distance in plenty of cases, it leaves
open the important case when X is the class of all consistent theories in Lβα (recall Problem 1).
Proposition 3.12. Let X be the class of all consistent theories formulated over a fixed language
L. Then, the class X does not have the theory amalgamation property. Moreover, e.g., if α = ω,
3 ≤ β ≤ ω and L contains at least a binary relation symbol, then X does not have the theory
co-amalgamation property either.
Proof. Let L be a language and let X be the class of all consistent theories of language L. Let
T = ∅, T1 = {∃v0 (v0 = v0)} and T2 = {∀v0 (v0 6= v0)} be three theories in X. Then clearly,
T1 → T ← T2, but there is no consistent theory T ′ ∈ X for which T1 ← T ′ → T2. Hence, X does
not have the theory amalgamation property.
Now assume that α = ω, 3 ≤ β ≤ ω and L contains at least one binary relation symbol R. For
every n ∈ N, let
(5) Ψ(n)
def
= ∃v0 ∃v1 · · · ∃vn−1



 ∧
0≤i6=j≤n−1
vi 6= vj

 ∧ ∀vn

 ∨
0≤i≤n−1
vn = vi



 .
The formula Ψ(n) is saying that there are exactly n-many objects. Let
T1 = {¬Ψ
(2n) : n ∈ N} and T2 = {¬Ψ
(2n+1) : n ∈ N}
be two theories in X. Then a model of T1 is a model for L which have odd finite or infinite
cardinality. Similarly, a model of T2 is a model for L which have even finite or infinite cardinality.
Let ϕ be a formula in language L requiring that there are infinitely many objects. Using the relation
symbol R it is easy to write up such a formula by requiring that R is irreflexive, transitive and
serial. Then, clearly, T1 ∪ {ϕ} ≡ T2 ∪ {ϕ} ≡ {ϕ} and T1 ← {ϕ} → T2.
However, there is no theory T ′ for which T1 → T ′ ← T2 because (1) all the common consequences
of T1 and T2 are tautologies, i.e., Cn(T1) ∩ Cn(T2) ≡ ∅ since every model M for L is either a
model for T1 or a model for T2, and (2) neither T1 nor T2 is finitely axiomatizable. The non-
finite axiomatizability of T1 can be confirmed as follows. For each i ∈ N, let Mi be a model for
L whose cardinality is 2i. Clearly, Mi cannot be a model for T1. However, the ultraproduct of
the models Mi’s (over a free ultrafilter) is a model for T1 because it is of infinite cardinality (for
some details about ultraproducts, we refer the reader to [van Dalen, 2013, Chapter 4.5]). Thus, by
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[van Dalen, 2013, Theorem 4.5.27 (ii)], it follows that T1 is not finitely axiomatizable. Same applies
to T2 by taking ultraproduct of finite models having cardinalities 2i+ 1 for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, the theories T1 and T2 are not finitely axiomatizable over their common consequences.
Hence, there is no theory T ′ in X for which T1 → T ′ ← T2. Consequently, the class X does not
have the theory co-amalgamation property. 
It is worth noting that even if the range of the axiomatic distance consists only of four elements (cf.,
Theorem 3.11 and Problem 1), this does not mean that this distance is not interesting. However,
it might be true that the distance defined in this way does not tell us much information on the
nature of the axioms separating two theories, adding any axiom is considered as one step. One can
overcome this problem by giving weights to the axiom adding steps, e.g., considering the addition
of certain kind of axioms as two or more steps.
4. Conceptual distance
In 1935, A. Tarski introduced the so-called Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras as a device to establish
correspondence between logic and algebras. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of a theory T
is the quotient algebra obtained by factoring the algebra of formulas by the congruence relation
of logical equivalence between formulas. These algebras are also called concept algebras, e.g., in
[Andre´ka and Ne´meti, 2017]. This reflects the fact that the underlying set of a Lindenbaum-Tarski
algebra consists of the different concepts that can be defined within the corresponding theory.
Definition 4.1. A concept in theory T is a maximal set of logically equivalent formulas in T . In
other words, a concept in T is the set [ϕ]T
def
= {ψ ∈ Fm : T |= ϕ↔ ψ}, for some formula ϕ.
Intuitively, by a concept we mean a definition, no matter how many different ways one can write
it equivalently. Now, we define conceptual size of a theory T to be the size of the underlying set of
the corresponding Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. It might be more convenient in some cases to use
cardinality here instead of size.
Definition 4.2. Let T be a theory and let k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. We say that the conceptual size of T
is k and we write Cz(T ) = k iff the set {[ϕ]T : ϕ ∈ Fm} is of size k.
This is equivalent to saying that a theory T is of conceptual size k iff there is a maximal set X ⊆ Fm
of size k such that T 6|= ϕ ↔ ψ for each ϕ, ψ ∈ X . It is also worthy of note that, when α ≥ ω, a
theory that has a model of at least two different elements cannot have a finite conceptual size.
Proposition 4.3. Let T, T ′ be two theories. If there is a faithful interpretation from T to T ′, then
we have Cz(T ) ≤ Cz(T ′). Consequently,
T ⇄ T ′ =⇒ Cz(T ) = Cz(T ′).
Proof. Let T and T ′ be two theories, and suppose that tr is a faithful interpretation of T into T ′.
Now, there is a maximal set X ⊆ Fm of size Cz(T ) such that T 6|= ϕ↔ ψ for any ϕ, ψ ∈ X . Let
X ′ = {tr(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ X} ⊆ Fm′.
Since tr is a faithful interpretation, T ′ 6|= tr(ϕ ↔ ψ). Hence T ′ 6|= tr(ϕ) ↔ tr(ψ) since tr is an
interpretation. Consequently, Cz(T ) ≤ Cz(T ′). If T ⇄ T ′, then by Proposition 2.6 there are
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faithful interpretations between T and T ′ in both directions. Hence Cz(T ) ≤ Cz(T ′) ≤ Cz(T ).
Therefore, Cz(T ) = Cz(T ′) as desired. 
As a matter of fact, two theories are definitionally equivalent iff their Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras
are isomorphic [Henkin et al., 1985, Theorem 4.3.43]. So, the above Proposition is a consequence
of the straightforward observation: Two algebras of different sizes cannot be isomorphic.
Now, we want to define a distance counting the minimum number of concepts that distinguish two
theories T and T ′. It is very natural to explain the idea within the framework of Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebras, since these are concept algebras and we want to count cocnepts. For simplicity, let
us assume that the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra A of T is embeddable into the Lindenbuam-Tarski
algebra A′ of T ′. Thus, the minimum number of concepts distinguish the two theories is equal to
the minimum number of elements of A′ that we can add to A (more precisely, to one of its copies
inside A′) to generate the algebra A′, see Figure 4.
A
B
A
′
• a
Figure 4. The distance between A and A′ is one if 〈B, a〉 ∼= A′.
The following definitions illustrate the above idea, but in terms of logic instead of algebras. As
we mentioned before, the correspondence between the following definitions and the above algebraic
idea is planned to be discussed in details in a forthcoming algebra oriented paper.
Definition 4.4. We say that theory T ′ is a one-concept-extension of theory T and we write
T  T ′ iff L′ = L∪{R}, for some relation symbol R, and T ⊑ T ′. We also write T ∼ T ′ iff T  T ′
or T ′  T , and in this case we say that T and T ′ are separated by at most one concept.
Again, we understand concept removal to be the converse of concept adding. Later, in Section 6,
we are going to introduce another notion for concept removal, and a corresponding distance notion.
Definition 4.5. Let X be a class of theories. The step distance induced by the cluster network
(X,⇄,∼) is called conceptual distance on X and is denoted by CdX. In the case when X is the
class of all theories in Lβα, we denote the conceptual distance on X by Cd
β
α.
By Remark 3.6, it is clear that Cdβα(T, T
′) ≥ Cdγα(T, T
′) for any ordinal β ≤ γ ≤ α + 1 and any
theories T and T ′ in Lβα. It is also apparent that an inconsistent theory is of an infinite conceptual
distance from any consistent theory, because relations ⇄ and  cannot make a consistent theory
inconsistent and also cannot make an inconsistent theory consistent. Now, we give more examples.
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Lemma 4.6. Let k,m be two finite numbers. Let T and T ′ be two theories such that T ⊑ T ′.
Suppose that L′ = L ∪ {R}, for some relation R whose rank rank(R) = m. Then,
I(T ′, k) ≤ 2k
m
I(T, k).
Proof. This follows immediately from the following fact: If M is a model of size k, then there are
at most 2k
m
different ways of defining a relation of rank m in M. 
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that β ≥ 1. For every n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, there are theories T and T ′ in Lβα
such that Cdβα(T, T
′) = n.
Proof. Let L∞ be a language for Lβα that consists of infinitely many relation symbols (describing
infinitely many different concepts), each of which is of a fixed rank γ < β.
(6) R1, R2, . . .
For each n ∈ N, we let Ln ⊆ L∞ be the language consists of the first n-many relation symbols from
the list in (6), and we let T ⋆n = ∅ be the empty theory on language Ln. Let n ∈ N∪{∞}. It is clear
that Cdβα(T
⋆
0 , T
⋆
n) ≤ n. We need to prove the other direction. We consider the following cases:
Suppose that β is finite. In this case, we assume that γ = β − 1. Let k ≥ 1 be a finite number. By
Lemma 4.6, it follows that, for each pair of theories T1, T2 in logic L
β
α,
(7) T1  T2 =⇒ I(T2, k) ≤ 2
kβ−1I(T1, k).
Moreover, it is easy to see that
(8) I(T ⋆n , k) = 2
nkβ−1 (we define this entity to be ∞ if n =∞),
because there are exactly n-many relation symbols, each of which is of rank β − 1, in Ln. Thus, at
least n-many steps are needed to increase I(T ⋆0 , k) = 2
0 = 1 to I(T ⋆n , k) = 2
nkβ−1 . Therefore, we
have Cdβα(T
⋆
0 , T
⋆
n) = n as required.
Suppose that β is infinite. We do not need any extra assumption on γ. All what we need here is to
count models of size 1. By (8), we have I(T ⋆n , 1) = 2
n. Moreover, for any two theories T1 and T2,
(9) T1  T2 =⇒ I(T2, 1) ≤ 2I(T1, 1).
This is true because in a model of size 1 there are at most two relations (of any fixed rank). Again,
for the same reasons, we need at least n-many steps to increase I(T ⋆0 , 1) = 2
0 = 1 to I(T ⋆n , 1) = 2
n.
Therefore, Cdβα(T
⋆
0 , T
⋆
n) = n as desired. 
Our constructions in the above proof for the case when β is infinite (and hence α is also infinite)
all have models of size 1. In Theorem 4.10 below, we investigate what happens if the theories in
question do not have models of size 1. First, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that α = β = ω. Let T1, T2 and T3 be theories such that
I(T1, 1) = I(T2, 1) = I(T3, 1) = 0.
Then, if T1  T2  T3, then there is a theory T such that T1  T ⇄ T3.
14 FRIEND ET AL.
20
2k
β−1
T⋆1
T⋆0
22k
β−1
T⋆2
23k
β−1
T⋆3
24k
β−1
T⋆4
25k
β−1
T⋆5
26k
β−1
T⋆6
I(T, k)
theories
Figure 5. Theorem 4.7: Cdβα(T
⋆
0 , T
⋆
n) = n
Proof. Suppose T1, T2 and T3 are as required in the statement of the lemma above, and assume
that T1  T2  T3. Then L3 = L1 ∪ {R,S} for some relation symbols R and S. Suppose that
rank(R) = n and rank(S) = m. Let l = max{n,m}+ 2. Let L
def
= L1 ∪ {B}, for some new relation
symbol B of rank l. Every model M for L3 can be extended to a model M+ for L by defining BM
+
as follows:
BM
+ def
= {(a0, . . . , al−1) ∈M
l : ∃ an assignment τ
(
τ(v0) = a0, · · · , τ(vl−1) = al−1 and M, τ |= ψ
)
},
where ψ(v0, . . . , vl−1)
def
=
(
R(v0, . . . , vn−1) ∧ vl−2 = vl−1
)
∨
(
S(v0, . . . , vm−1) ∧ vl−2 6= vl−1
)
. Let
T
def
= {ϕ ∈ Fm : M+ |= ϕ, for every model M for T3}.
We need to prove that T1  T and T ⇄ T3. To prove that T1  T , it is enough to show that
T1 ⊑ T (because L = L1 ∪ {B}). Let ϕ ∈ Fm1. We have
T1 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T2 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T3 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T |= ϕ,
where the first two equivalences follow by the assumption T1 ⊑ T2 ⊑ T3, and the last equivalence
follows by the definition of T . To show that T ⇄ T3, we define the translations tr : Fm → Fm3
and tr′ : Fm3 → Fm as follows:
tr : B(v0, . . . , vl−2, vl−1) 7→ ψ(v0, . . . , vl−1) and
tr′ : R(v0, . . . , vn−1) 7→ ∃vl−1
(
B(v0, . . . , vl−2, vl−1) ∧ (vl−2 = vl−1)
)
tr′ : S(v0, . . . , vm−1) 7→ ∃vl−1
(
B(v0, . . . , vl−2, vl−1) ∧ (vl−2 6= vl−1)
)
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We have defined tr and tr′ on specific basic formulas and these can be extended in a unique way to
their domains, see Footnote 4. Let M be a model for T3. By definition of the extension M
+,
(10) M+ |= B(v0, . . . , vl−2, vl−1)↔ ψ(v0, . . . , vl−2, vl−1).
Thus, by (10), we have
M
+ |= tr′(S(v0, . . . , vm−1)) ↔ ∃vl−1
(
B(v0, . . . , vl−2, vl−1) ∧ vl−2 6= vl−1
)
↔ ∃vl−1
(
((R(v0, . . . , vn−1) ∧ vl−2 = vl−1) ∧
(S(v0, . . . , vm−1) ∧ vl−2 6= vl−1)) ∧ vl−2 6= vl−1
)
↔ ∃vl−1 (S(v0, . . . , vm−1) ∧ vl−2 6= vl−1))
↔ S(v0, . . . , vm−1).
The last ↔ follows by the assumption that the cardinality of M is at least 2 (and hence the same
is true for M+). Similarly, M+ |= tr′(R(v0, . . . , vn−1)) ↔ R(v0, . . . , vn−1). Therefore, by the fact
that tr and tr′ are translations, it follows that
(11) M+ |= ϕ↔ tr(ϕ) and M+ |= ψ ↔ tr′(ψ)
for all ϕ ∈ Fm and ψ ∈ Fm3. By (11), it is not hard to see that tr and tr
′ are definitional equivalences,
and the desired follows. 
The above lemma is a direct consequence of the following elementary fact. In Lωω (under some
conditions), for any two relations R and S, there is a relation M such that M is definable in terms
of R and S and, conversely, both R and S are definable in terms of M , see [Goodman, 1943]. The
idea of the above proof is distilled from [Henkin et al., 1971, Theorem 2.3.22].
Corollary 4.9. Suppose that α = β = ω. Let T1, T2, . . . , Tn, for some n ≥ 2, be theories such that
I(Ti, 1) = 0, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then,
T1  T2  · · · Tn =⇒ there is a theory T such that T1  T ⇄ Tn.
Proof. This can be proved by a simple induction on n. If n = 2, then we are obviously done.
Suppose that n ≥ 3 and T1  T2  · · ·Tn−1  Tn. If by induction hypothesis we can assume that
there is T ′ such that T2  T
′
⇄ Tn, then T1  T2  T
′
⇄ Tn. Therefore, by the Lemma 4.8,
there is theory T such that T1  T ⇄ Tn. 
Theorem 4.10. Suppose that α = β = ω. Let T and T ′ be theories on finite languages. Then,
I(T, 1) = I(T ′, 1) = 0 =⇒ Cdωω(T, T
′) =∞ or Cdωω(T, T
′) ≤ 2.
Proof. Let T and T ′ be theories on finite languages and suppose that I(T, 1) = I(T ′, 1) = 0. Let
us assume that Cdωω(T1, T2) <∞. Let L be the empty language. For each ϕ ∈ Fm,
(12) T1 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T2 |= ϕ.
This is true because Cdωω(T, T
′) <∞ and the validity of each ϕ ∈ Fm is preserved under conservative
extensions and definitional equivalences. Let T = {ϕ ∈ Fm : T1 |= ϕ and T2 |= ϕ}. Then, by (12),
it is true that T ⊑ T1 and T ⊑ T2. We also claim that
(13) Cdωω(T, T1) ≤ 1 and Cd
ω
ω(T, T2) ≤ 1.
To show (13), let us assume that L = {Ri : i < m}, for some finite m. If m = 0, then T ≡ T1 and
thus Cdωω(T, T1) = 0. Assume that m 6= 0. Let L
⋆
0 = {R0}, . . . ,L
⋆
m−1 = {R0, . . . , Rm−1} and, for
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each 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, T ⋆i = {ϕ ∈ Fm
⋆
i : T1 |= ϕ}. Hence, T  T
⋆
0  · · ·  T
⋆
m−1 ≡ T1. Clearly,
for each 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, I(T ⋆i , 1) = 0 because ¬Ψ
(1) = ¬
(
∃v0 ∀v1 (v0 = v1)
)
is a theorem of T , and
hence is a theorem of T ⋆i . Thus, by Corollary 4.9, it follows that Cd
ω
ω(T, T1) ≤ 1. Similarly, one
can show that Cdωω(T, T2) ≤ 1. Therefore, Cd
ω
ω(T1, T2) ≤ Cd
ω
ω(T, T1) + Cd
ω
ω(T, T2) ≤ 2. 
We prove one more statement investigating the connection between the spectrum of theories and
conceptual distance in Lωω .
Theorem 4.11. Suppose that α = β = ω. Let T and T ′ be two theories formulated in countable
languages. Then,
(14) Cdωω(T, T
′) <∞ =⇒ (∀ cardinal κ)
[
I(T, κ) 6= 0 ⇐⇒ I(T ′, κ) 6= 0
]
.
If T and T ′ are formulated in finite languages, then the converse of (14) is also true.
Proof. In this proof, we will make use of the formulas Ψ(n)’s defined in (5). Recall that with the
formula Ψ(n), we require every model to be of cardinality n. Let T and T ′ be as required, and let κ
be any cardinal. Suppose that κ is finite, then T does not have a model of size κ iff T |= ¬Ψ(κ). But,
T ′ |= ¬Ψ(κ) ⇐⇒ T |= ¬Ψ(κ) because of the assumption Cdωω(T, T
′) < ∞ and the fact that the
validity of Ψ(κ) is preserved under conservative extensions and definitional equivalences. Hence, T ′
has a model of cardinality κ iff T has a model of cardinality κ. If κ is an infinite cardinality, then by
Lo¨venheim–Skolem Theorem, T and T ′ have models of cardinality κ iff they have infinite models.
T has an infinite model iff T |= ∃v0 ∃v1 · · · ∃vn−1
(∧
0≤i6=j≤n−1 vi 6= vj
)
for all n ∈ N. Again,
the validity of the formulas ∃v0 ∃v1 · · · ∃vn−1
(∧
0≤i6=j≤n−1 vi 6= vj
)
is preserved under conservative
extensions and definitional equivalences. Thus, the assumption Cdωω(T, T
′) <∞ implies that
T ′ |= ∃v0 ∃v1 · · · ∃vn−1

 ∧
0≤i6=j≤n−1
vi 6= vj

 ⇐⇒ T |= ∃v0 ∃v1 · · · ∃vn−1

 ∧
0≤i6=j≤n−1
vi 6= vj

 .
Hence, T has an infinite model and thus a model of cardinality κ iff T ′ has such a model.
To prove the converse of (14), let us assume that T and T ′ are formulated in finite languages L
and L′, respectively. Assume that, for every cardinal κ, T has a model of cardinality κ iff T ′ has a
model of the same cardinality. Let L0 be the empty language. Then, for every ϕ ∈ Fm0,
T |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T ′ |= ϕ.
Let T0 = {ϕ ∈ Fm0 : T |= ϕ and T ′ |= ϕ}. Thus, T0 ⊑ T and T0 ⊑ T ′. Now, we can add the
whole L to L0 in finitely many steps, because there only finitely many relation symbols in L, thus
Cdωω(T0, T ) <∞. Similarly, Cd
ω
ω(T0, T
′) <∞. Therefore,
Cdωω(T, T
′) ≤ Cdωω(T0, T ) + Cd
ω
ω(T0, T
′) <∞. 
Corollary 4.12. The conceptual distance between the theories of any two finite models of different
cardinalities is infinite. More precisely, if A and B are two finite models of different cardinality,
then Cdωω
(
Th(A),Th(B)
)
=∞.
For instance, given two cyclic groups 〈k1〉 and 〈k2〉 of orders 5 and 7, respectively, the conceptual
distance between the theories of these groups is ∞. This might seem strange; these theories are
about similar structures. But if we look carefully at the statement of the above corollary, we will find
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that it talks about theories of structures, not structures themselves. In other words, the conceptual
distance between the theories of 〈k1〉 and 〈k2〉 cannot be granted as a distance between these two
groups as algebraic structures. This conceptual distance can be rather considered as a distance
between the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of the theories of these groups, which are of course of
different nature than the groups themselves.
Corollary 4.13. There are infinitely many theories that are, in terms of conceptual distance,
infinitely far from each other in Lωω .
Problem 2. Let X be the class of all complete and consistent theories in Lωω , and let T1, T2 ∈ X.
Is it always true that
Cdωω(T1, T2) = CdX(T1, T2)?
5. Conceptual distance in physics
Each physical theory is established based on some preliminary decisions. These decisions are sug-
gested by the accumulation and the assimilation of new knowledge. The methods used to improve
physical theories are intuitively conceived and applied in a fruitful way, but many obvious ambigu-
ities have appeared. To clarify these ambiguities, it was critical to introduce the logical foundation
of physical theories .
Even today the logic based axiomatic foundation of physical theories is intensively investigated by
several research groups. For example, the Andre´ka–Ne´meti school axiomatizes and investigates spe-
cial and general relativity theories within ordinary first order logic, see, e.g., [Andre´ka et al., 2002],
[Andre´ka et al., 2004] and [Andre´ka et al., 2012]. For similar approaches related to other physical
theories, see, e.g., [Baltag and Smets, 2005] and [Krause and Arenhart, 2017].
Following Andre´ka–Ne´meti school’s traditions, two theories ClassicalKin and SpecRel are formulated
in ordinary first order logic Lωω to capture the intrinsic structures of classical and relativistic kine-
matics. For the precise definitions of these theories, one can see [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.67
and p. 69]. In this section, we will investigate the conceptual distance between these two theories.
In [Lefever, 2017] and [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a], it was shown that these two theories can be
turned definitionally equivalent by the following two concept manipulating steps:
(1) adding the concept of an observer “being stationary” to the theory of relativistic kinematics
SpecRel, and
(2) removing the concept of observers “not moving slower than light” from the theory of classical
kinematics ClassicalKin.
Then, it was shown that even if observers “not moving slower than light” are removed from
ClassicalKin the resulting theory remains definitionally equivalent to ClassicalKin and hence adding
only the concept of “being stationary” to SpecRel is enough to make the two theories equivalent.
Thus, it follows that the conceptual distance between relativistic and classical kinematics is 1.
Theorem 5.1. Classical and relativistic kinematics are distinguished from each other by only one
concept, namely the existence of some distinguished observers captured by formula (15) below, i.e.,
Cdωω(ClassicalKin, SpecRel) = 1.
7
7It is worth noting that in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we add only a unary concept E to SpecRel to get a theory
definitionally equivalent to ClassicalKin.
18 FRIEND ET AL.
Proof. The key to this result is the surprising theorem stating that the only concept which needs
to be added to SpecRel to make it definitional equivalent to ClassicalKin is a concept distinguish-
ing a set of observers that are “being at absolute rest” as shown in [Lefever, 2017, p.72] and
[Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.110]. Let E be a unary relation symbol corresponding to this basic
concept. Axiom AxPrimitiveEther, see [Lefever, 2017, p.46] and [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.87],
defines E as follows:
(15) ∃v0
[
IOb(v0) ∧ ∀v1
(
E(v1)↔ [IOb(v1) ∧ ϕ(v0, v1)]
)]
,
where IOb is a unary relation symbol represents inertial observers and ϕ(v0, v1) is a formula in the
language of SpecRel capturing that observers v0 and v1 are stationary with respect to each other.
In this proof, we only need that ϕ(v0, v1) is a formula with two free variables in the language of
SpecRel; its concrete definition plays no rule here. Let
SpecRelE = SpecRel ∪ {AxPrimitiveEther}.
First, we need to prove that SpecRel SpecRelE. To do so, it is enough to show that SpecRelE is a
conservative extension of SpecRel, i.e., SpecRel ⊑ SpecRelE, because the languages of these theories
differ only in the unary relation symbol E. So, we need to show that for any formula ρ of the
language of SpecRel,
SpecRel |= ρ ⇐⇒ SpecRelE |= ρ.
Let ρ be an arbitrary formula of the language of SpecRel. Since SpecRel ⊆ SpecRelE, SpecRel |=
ρ implies SpecRelE |= ρ. We prove the other direction by proving that, if SpecRel 6|= ρ, then
SpecRelE 6|= ρ. Let M be a model of SpecRel. Since SpecRel |= ∃v0IOb(v0), there exists an
a ∈ IObM. Let us fix such element a of IObM and let extension M′ of M be defined by adding the
following relation to M:
EM
′
=
{
b ∈ IObM : ∃ an assignment τ
[
τ(v0) = a, τ(v1) = b and M, τ |= ϕ
]}
,
where ϕM is the binary relation defined by formula ϕ(v0, v1) in model M. By construction, M
′ is a
model of SpecRelE. Therefore, if M |= ¬ρ, then M′ |= ¬ρ, because M′ is an extension of M means
that Th(M) ⊑ Th(M′). Consequently, SpecRel 6|= ρ implies SpecRelE 6|= ρ, which is what we wanted
to prove. This completes the proof of SpecRel SpecRelE, and hence
Cdωω(SpecRel, SpecRel
E) ≤ 1.
By Corollary 9 in [Lefever, 2017, p.72] and [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a, p.110], SpecRelE is defini-
tionally equivalent to ClassicalKin. Hence,
Cdωω(SpecRel
E,ClassicalKin) = 0.
Therefore,
Cdωω(SpecRel,ClassicalKin) ≤ Cd
ω
ω(SpecRel, SpecRel
E) + Cdωω(SpecRel
E,ClassicalKin) = 1.
Moreover, Cdωω(SpecRel,ClassicalKin) cannot be 0 since SpecRel and ClassicalKin are not definition-
ally equivalent, see Theorem 5 in [Lefever, 2017] or [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a]. Consequently,
Cdωω(SpecRel,ClassicalKin) = 1
and thus the desired follows. 
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There are several ways how one can capture the structures of relativistic and classical kinematics
in first order logic. Let us now introduce another way to capture these theories. Let R be the
set of all real numbers. Let Ph ⊆ R4 × R4 be such that (x¯, y¯) ∈ Ph iff coordinate points x¯ and y¯
can be connected by a light signal, i.e., if (x1 − y1)2 − (x2 − y2)2 − (x3 − y3)2 − (x4 − y4)2 = 0.
Let S ⊆ R4 × R4 be the simultaneity relation, i.e., (x¯, y¯) ∈ S iff x1 = y1. Consider the models
R = 〈R4,Ph〉 and N = 〈R4, S,Ph〉, these models capture the structure of special relativity and
classical kinematics, respectively.
Let Tn = Th(N) and Tr = Th(R). Note that Tn is in fact a conservative extension of Tr and the
conceptual distance between them is 1, i.e., Cdωω(Tn, Tr) = 1.
Problem 3 (Hajnal Andre´ka). Let X be the class of all theories T such that Tr is faithfully
interpreted into T and T is faithfully interpreted into Tn. Is the following true: For all T ∈ X ,
Cdωω(Tr, T ) + Cd
ω
ω(T, Tn) = 1?
If the answer to the question in the above problem is yes, then no matter which classical (i.e.,
Tn-definable, but not Tr-definable) concept we add to special relativity (Tr) we will get classical
kinematics (Tn). That would be an interesting insight for better understanding the connection
between classical and relativistic concepts.
The investigation in this section opens so many questions: For any two concrete theories of physics,
what is the conceptual distance between them? By Theorem 5.1, relativistic and classical kinematics
are of conceptual distance one. However, the question “what is the distance between relativistic
and classical dynamics?” remains open. Another natural related open problem is the following.
Problem 4 (Jean Paul Van Bendegem). What is the conceptual distance between classical and
statistical thermodynamics?
Of course, any answer to the above problems depends on the chosen axiomatizable theories capturing
the physical theories in question. For an axiomatic approach of these thermodynamics theories, one
can see, e.g., [Carathe´odory, 1909], [Cooper, 1967] and [Lieb and Yngvason, 2000].
6. Ideas for other distances
Interpreting a theory into another one is a fundamental concept in logic. In the following definition,
we define some distance that uses faithful interpretations as the minimal step between theories.
Definition 6.1. For any two theories T1 and T2, we write T1 I T2 iff one of these theories can be
interpreted faithfully into the other one. Let X be an arbitrary class of theories in Lβα. The faithful
interpretation distance on X is defined as the step distance on the cluster network (X,≡, I).
Another natural idea one may have for defining a distance between theories is using a step that
collapses two concepts into one, i.e., using the symmetric closure of following relation for the minimal
single steps.
Definition 6.2. Let T, T ′ be two theories. We say that T ′ is the resultant of T after collapsing
two concepts iff T ′ ≡ T ∪ {ϕ↔ ψ}, for some ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm.
Example 6.3. The theory of abelian groups (in ordinary first order logic) is the resultant of the
theory of all groups after collapsing the concepts a · b = c and b · a = c.
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One can easily see that collapsing two concepts of a theory T is a special case of adding an axiom
to T . The converse is also true; adding an axiom ϕ to T is equivalent to collapsing the concept
ϕ with any theorem of T . So using the symmetric closure of the above relation for generating a
distance will give the axiomatic distance (Definition 3.7).
6.1. Dropping symmetry. In several cases, it might be natural not to assume the symmetry of
distances between theories. For example, any inconsistent theory is understood to be of axiomatic
distance 1 from any consistent theory; we just need to add a contradiction as an axiom. But
starting from an inconsistent theory, we can never reach a consistent theory by adding axioms; so
considering this distance to be ∞ seems more natural.
Now, let us mimic the work of section 3 under the consideration that symmetry is not required. For
instance, a directed cluster network is a triple (X,E,R), where (X,E) is a cluster and R is an
arbitrary relation on X. For directed cluster network X = (X,E,R), the directed step distance
~dX : X × X → N ∪ {∞} can be defined completely analogously to step distance. With a very
similar argument to the proof of Theorem 3.5, we can see that the following are true: For each
T1, T2, T3 ∈ X,
(a) ~dX (T1, T2) ≥ 0 and ~dX (T1, T2) = 0 ⇐⇒ T1 ET2.
(b) ~dX (T1, T2) ≤ ~dX (T1, T3) + ~dX (T3, T2).
Definition 6.4. Recall the axiom adding relation← introduced on page 7 herein. Let X be a class
of theories in logic Lβα, then (X,≡,←) is a directed cluster network. Its directed step distance is
called the directed axiomatic distance on X.
Clearly, Theorem 3.11 is no longer true if we replace the axiomatic distance by the mimicked directed
one. So, this is one of the situations where dropping the symmetry might be more interesting. Not
just the axiomatic distance can be directed, but also the conceptual distance, faithful interpretation
distance, and so on. It might be more appropriate to call these distances “uni-directed distances”,
indeed in the directed cluster network the single steps are determined by only one relation. We can
also define bi-directed distances or multi-directed distances where the single steps can be determined
by two or more relations.
For example, it might be useful to introduce a “new conceptual distance” that measures the min-
imum number of concepts needed to be added to or removed from one theory to reach the other
theory up to definitional equivalence. We already have a notion for concept adding (recall  in
Definition 4.4). A precise definition for concept removal is also required. So, in this case, two
relations will indicate the single steps and such new conceptual distance must be a bi-directed step
distance. The notion of concept-removal below is inspired by the idea how the concept of faster-
than-light observers were removed from the theory capturing classical kinematics in [Lefever, 2017]
and [Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a].
Definition 6.5. Let T, T− be two theories. We say that T− is a concept-removal of T and we
write T ⋗T− iff there is ϕ ∈ Fm such that T− = Tm∪{¬ϕ} for some maximal consistent subtheorey
of Cn(T ) for which Tm 6|= ϕ.
In some cases, it is possible to remove finitely many concepts in only one step. For instance, assume
that α = 0 and β = 1, and let L1 = {P1, P2} and L2 = {P1, P2, P3, P4} for some sentential constants
P1, P2, P3 and P4. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ti be the empty theory on the language Li. Recall the
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proof of Theorem 4.7, it was shown that we need exactly two steps of adding concepts to get T2
from T1. However, removing a single concept, namely (P2 6= P3) ∨ (P3 6= P4), from T2 gives T1.
Definition 6.6. Let X be a class of theories and let R be the union of the relations and ⋗. The
bi-directed conceptual distance on X is the directed step distance on (X,⇄,R). In the case
when X is the class of all theories of logic Lβα, we denote this distance by
~Cdβα.
The facts, in the paragraph before the above definition, that ~Cdβα(T1, T2) = 2 and
~Cdβα(T2, T1) = 1
show that the bi-directed distance is not symmetric. Hence, conceptual and bi-directed conceptual
distances are different, but it is still interesting to understand how much different they are. For
example, the following problem is worth investigating.
Problem 5. Are there two theories T and T ′ such that
(1) Cdβα(T, T
′), ~Cdβα(T, T
′) and ~Cdβα(T
′, T ) are all finite,
(2) Cdβα(T, T
′) 6= ~Cdβα(T, T
′) and Cdβα(T, T
′) 6= ~Cdβα(T
′, T )?
It is not straightforward to find this example, each conceptual distance calculated in the present
paper coincides with one of its corresponding bi-directed conceptual distances. In order to do the
same with axiomatic distance, i.e., to define a bi-directed axiomatic distance, all we need is a precise
definition for theorem removal. We propose the following theorem-removal notion.
Definition 6.7. Let T, T− be two theories. We say that T− is a theorem-removal of T iff there
is ϕ ∈ Fm such that T |= ϕ and T− is maximal consistent subtheorey of Cn(T ) for which T− 6|= ϕ.
7. Concluding philosophical remarks
One very important topic in the philosophy of science, is how different scientific theories can be
compared to each other, especially in the case of competing theories. The first criterion for theory
comparison is empirical adequacy. One theory is better than another if it accounts for more of the
data or phenomena than another. In the past, this has often been, or has been presented as being,
a fairly straightforward matter to decide by philosophers and historians.
This is oversimplified for two reasons. One is that sometimes in the history of science, one theory
accounts for some of the data or phenomena very well. Another accounts for another area of
data very well. They both agree on, but have different accounts of, the same data and both have
failings. The comparison of two theories in terms of empirical adequacy requires that we count
the data or the phenomena. Deciding what to count, and how to assign weight to it, has some
arbitrariness to it. This is very well illustrated in [Chang, 2012] where he discusses the history of
the competition between the phlogiston theory of water and the compound theory of water. With
Chang, we conclude that deciding that one theory is more empirically adequate than another is
not at all times, and in all circumstances, simple and straightforward, and with the fragmentation
of science into more and more specialized areas of research, it is increasingly rare to find empirical
adequacy to be enough to decide between competing theories.
Worse: with more complicated and “cutting-edge” examples, we find that observation in science
is not simple, but is informed by instruments, theory and language; making an observation is an
informed and educated act. At the edges of science, we make observations using highly specialized
instruments, which are constructed based on their own theories. Thus, what looked in the past to be
a relatively simple judgment to make: “this scientific theory is better than this other” turns out to
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be rather subtle; since it requires individuation and assigning weights, in a way that is independent
with respect to the theories themselves.
Under an over simplified view of the unity of science, the subtlety threatens any pretense science has
to objectivity, because what counts as a true and verifiable statement takes specialized instruments
that we assume to work according to the theory we have of the instrument. If someone has an
alternative account, then the explanation for the phenomenon changes. As a result, if we want to
recover some semblance of objectivity in science, it is ever more pressing to receive confirmation of
a theory from other directions independent of the theory.
In terms of objectivity, one reassuring feature of science is its precision. Logic is the most precise
form of investigation. Under the pressure of our considerations above, when we have several logical
theories that are each to some extent empirically adequate, it is not clear that we should retain one
and dismiss the other. We then have pluralism in science. Pluralism in science is an obvious philo-
sophical position when we consider that several theories are all more-or-less empirically adequate,
and show merits with respect to other, incomparable, or only artificially comparable, virtues and
vices. The virtues might include: simplicity (determined by language, proofs, metaphysical parsi-
mony or concepts), meeting a particular goal of the scientists, neatness of categorization, breadth of
categorisation, standardization of explanation or meeting operational opportunities and so on. Vices
might include: complexity (determined by language, proofs, metaphysical elaborations that have
little use within a theory or concepts), goal failure, messy or narrow categorization, non-standard
explanations, being too ambitious and not going outside the constraints of the operations available.
With this plethora of incommensurable theories all competing and each adequate in their own way
and for their own purpose, we look elsewhere than between the theories in and of themselves and
the data to make sense of the present state of science. What we then look for are other ways of
comparing theories, while accepting them until such time as we come up against a good reason to
give one up, such as: its being refuted by new evidence or being too remote from too many other
theories to be worth pursuing (now).
For this reason, the relations between theories, independent of their relation to reality, becomes
very important. Until now, this area of study has mostly been qualitative. In the present paper,
we explore a new quantitative approach: the measured distance between theories. To establish this
distance, we need to study the structure of the differences, i.e., the connections, between theories. By
developing several such metrics based on our definitions, and noticing that some are less interesting
than others, we already learn a lot. Counting axioms does not give us much information about the
distance between theories. Counting concepts is much more subtle and informative.
One area of study that has a close relationship with the notion of conceptual distance is that of
complexity. As we know, complexity, also can be measured in several ways: Turing complexity, in
terms of the analytic hierarchy, and so on. If one theory is more complex than another in one of
these measures, then it is natural to investigate the relationship between that and the distances we
look at here. Some of the significance of the present work might be in its relationship to complexity
theory. This is a subject of future investigation.
The idea of having a notion of distance between theories (of the same nature) seems applica-
ble in any science. In computer science, programming languages and other systems can be seen
as axiomatized theories. For more details about this, see, e.g., [Floyd, 1967], [Hoare, 1969] and
[Meyer and Halpern, 1982]. Hence, it seems also natural to search for the best fit notion of equiv-
alence between these theories. Developing this may give us insight to determine what can be one
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step difference between two such theories. Having these in mind, a distance can be then defined in
the same way of section 3 herein. The novelty here would be in choosing such equivalence and one
step relation in a way that guarantees that the corresponding step distance is applicable.
Acknowledgement.
We shall thank Hajnal Andre´ka, Jean Paul Van Bendegem, Zala´n Gyenis, Pe´ter Juha´sz, Istva´n
Ne´meti and others for their fruitful comments and questions. We are especially grateful for Judit
X. Madara´sz because of her insightful comments leading us to significantly improve the paper.
References
[Andre´ka et al., 2004] Andre´ka, H., Madara´sz, J. X., and Ne´meti, I. (2004). Logical analysis of relativity theories. In
First-order Logic Revisited, pages 7–36. Logos Verlag.
[Andre´ka et al., 2005] Andre´ka, H., Madara´sz, J. X., and Ne´meti, I. (2005). Mutual definability does not imply
definitional equivalence, a simple example. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 51,6:591–597.
[Andre´ka et al., 2012] Andre´ka, H., Madara´sz, J. X., Ne´meti, I., and Sze´kely, G. (2012). A logic road from special
relativity to general relativity. Synthese, 186,3:633–649.
[Andre´ka et al., 2002] Andre´ka, H., Madara´sz, J. X., Ne´meti, I., with contributions from: Andai, A., Sa´gi, G., Sain,
I., and To˝ke, C. (2002). On the logical structure of relativity theories. Research report, Alfre´d Re´nyi Institute of
Mathematics, Hungar. Acad. Sci., Budapest. https://old.renyi.hu//pub/ algebraic-logic/Contents.html.
[Andre´ka and Ne´meti, 2017] Andre´ka, H. and Ne´meti, I. (2017). How many varieties of cylindric algebras are there.
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 369:8903–8937.
[Baltag and Smets, 2005] Baltag, A. and Smets, S. (2005). Complete axiomatizations for quantum actions. Interna-
tional Journal of Theoretical Physics, 44(12):2267–2282.
[Barrett and Halvorson, 2016] Barrett, T. W. and Halvorson, H. (2016). Glymour and quine on theoretical equiva-
lence. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(5):467–483.
[Carathe´odory, 1909] Carathe´odory, C. (1909). Untersuchungen u¨ber die grundlagen der thermodynamik. Math.
Ann., 64:355–386.
[Chang, 2012] Chang, H. (2012). Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism. Springer, Dordrecht.
[Cooper, 1967] Cooper, J. L. B. (1967). The foundations of thermodynamics. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and
Applications, 17:172–193.
[Floyd, 1967] Floyd, R. W. (1967). Assingining meanings to programs. Proceedings of symposia in applied mathe-
matics, 19.
[Goodman, 1943] Goodman, N. (1943). On the simplicity of ideas. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 8(4):107–121.
[Henkin et al., 1971] Henkin, L., Monk, J., and Tarski, A. (1971). Cylindric Algebras Part I. North-Holland.
[Henkin et al., 1985] Henkin, L., Monk, J., and Tarski, A. (1985). Cylindric Algebras Part II. North-Holland.
[Hoare, 1969] Hoare, C. A. R. (1969). An axiomatic basis for computer programming. Communications of the ACM,
12(10):576–583.
[Japaridze and Jongh, 1998] Japaridze, G. and Jongh, D. (1998). The logic of provability. In Handbook of proof
theory, volume 137, pages 475–550. Elsevier.
[Krause and Arenhart, 2017] Krause, D. and Arenhart, J. R. B. (2017). The Logical Foundations of Scientific The-
ories: Languages, Structures, and Models. Routledge.
[Lefever, 2017] Lefever, K. (2017). Using Logical Interpretation and Definitional Equivalence to compare Classical
Kinematics and Special Relativity Theory. PhD thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
[Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018a] Lefever, K. and Sze´kely, G. (2018a). Comparing classical and relativistic kinematics in
first-order-logic. Logique et Analyse, 61(241):57–117.
[Lefever and Sze´kely, 2018b] Lefever, K. and Sze´kely, G. (2018b). On generalization of definitional equivalence to
languages with non-disjoint signatures. pre-print, arXiv:1802.06844.
[Lieb and Yngvason, 2000] Lieb, E. H. and Yngvason, J. (2000). A fresh look at entropy and the second law of
thermodynamics. Physics Today, pages 32–37.
[Meyer and Halpern, 1982] Meyer, A. R. and Halpern, J. Y. (1982). Axiomatic def’mitions of programming lan-
guages: A theoretical assessment. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, 29(2):555–576.
24 FRIEND ET AL.
[Pinter, 1978] Pinter, C. C. (1978). Properties preserved under definitional equivalence and interpretations. Zeitschr.
f. math. Logik und Grundlagen d. nlath., 24:481–488.
[van Dalen, 2013] van Dalen, D. (2013). Logic and Structure. Springer-Verlag London.
[Visser, 2006] Visser, A. (2006). Categories of theories and interpretations. In Logic in Tehran. Proceedings of the
workshop and conference on Logic, Algebra and Arithmetic, held October 18–22, 2003, volume 26 of Lecture Notes
in Logic, pages 284–341. ASL, A.K. Peters, Ltd., Wellesley, Mass.
MICHE`LE FRIEND
Columbian College of Arts & Sciences
George Washington University
E-mail: michele@gwu.edu
MOHAMED KHALED
Alfre´d Re´nyi Institute of Mathematics
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
E-mail: khaled.mohamed@renyi.mta.hu
KOEN LEFEVER
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
E-mail: koen.lefever@vub.be
GERGELY SZE´KELY
Alfre´d Re´nyi Institute of Mathematics
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
E-mail: szekely.gergely@renyi.mta.hu
